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Russia’s Agricultural Imports: Will the High
Growth of the 2000s Continue?
Les importations agricoles russes : la forte croissance des
années 2000 va-t-elle se poursuivre ?
Russlands Agrarimporte: Wird das starke Wachstum aus den 2000er
Jahren anhalten?
William M. Liefert, Olga Liefert and Mathew Shane
taking 10 per cent of its agricultural
exports worth €7.7 billion (Eurostat).
The EU countries together have also
been the main foreign supplier of
agricultural products to Russia, in
most years providing more than a
third of total imports, followed by
Brazil and the US (World Trade
Atlas).

Russia’s agricultural imports during
the 2000s have grown substantially,
from €7.4 billion in 2000 to €19.2
billion in 2007 (Figure 1). The
import growth has made Russia the
second largest agricultural importer
among emerging market economies,
after China. The main imports are
meat, highly processed products,
fruits and vegetables (Figure 2).
Russia’s agricultural exports have
also grown during this time, though
from a much lower base in value
terms (and with most of the
increase coming just from
grain).

Why have Russia’s agricultural
imports grown so much? Also, what is
the outlook for the country’s
agricultural imports for the next
4–5 years, especially given that the
country is suffering from its own
financial and economic crisis that
began in autumn 2008? Before
answering these questions, though,
we will examine whether Russian
agricultural imports during the 2000s
increased in volume as well as value
terms.

Europe has benefited strongly from
the rise in Russia’s agricultural
imports. During this decade, Russia
has been the EU’s second largest
foreign market for agricultural
products (after the US), in 2007
Figure 1: Russian agricultural trade
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Have Russian agricultural
imports also risen substantially
in volume?
The terse answer is ‘yes’. The values
in Figures 1–2 overstate Russia’s
import growth in volume terms on
one hand, but understate the growth
on the other. The overstatement
occurs because world agricultural
prices have increased since 2000,
especially over 2006–07. The price
growth has been highest for bulk
crops such as grain and soybeans, but
not very large for meat and processed
foods. Price growth for processed
foods has been lower mainly because
primary agricultural products typically
account for a small share of their total
value. For example, despite the more
than doubling of world prices for
grain over 2000–07, prices for grainbased processed foods (including
baked) for US urban consumers rose
over this period by only 19 per cent,
and just 9 per cent in 2006–07. During
the 2000s, Russia has been a
negligible importer of grain and
oilseeds and a large importer of meat
and processed foods. The growth in
Russia’s agricultural imports in value
terms therefore only mildly overstates
the growth in volume terms
(stemming from world agricultural
price inflation).
The reason why the import values in
Figures 1–2 understate volume
growth is because they are measured
in euros. From 2000 to 2007, the
euro rose in value (appreciated) in
real (inflation-adjusted) terms against
the US dollar, Brazilian real, and
EuroChoices 9(3) ƒ 43
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Figure 2: Russian agricultural imports
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currencies of most other countries
that export agricultural goods to
Russia. For example, over this time,
euro real appreciation against the
dollar equaled 46 per cent (ERS
International Macroeconomic Data
Set). If Russian agricultural imports
are valued in dollars rather than
euros, they increase from US$ 6.9
billion in 2000 to US$ 26.1 billion in
2007, a rise of about 280 per cent.
This compares to a 160 per cent
increase when the imports are
measured in euros.

La croissance de
ses importations a
conduit la Russie à
devenir le second plus
grand importateur
agricole des pays
émergents après la
Chine.

,,

One therefore can conclude that
imports rose substantially in volume
as well as value. For example, in 2007
meat comprised about a fifth of
Russia’s agricultural imports (in
value). Over 2000–07, Russian meat

imports (beef, pork, and poultry)
increased from 1.81 million metric
tons (mmt) to 3.22 mmt.

Why have Russian agricultural
imports grown?
There are two main causes of the
rise in Russia’s agricultural imports
during the 2000s, both
macroeconomic in nature. The first
is high GDP growth, which since
2000 has averaged almost 7 per cent
a year. GDP growth has increased
consumer income and demand for
food, though this benefits not only
foreign suppliers but also domestic
producers.
The second major cause of rising
agricultural imports is change in the
exchange rate for the Russian ruble,
in a way that has made imports more
price competitive compared to
domestically produced goods. During
the 2000s, Russia’s nominal exchange
rate (the rate people actually use to
buy and sell rubles) has fluctuated to
some degree against the euro, US
dollar, and other major currencies.
But more importantly, Russia has had
higher price inflation than the EU,
US, and many other countries that
export to it. Since 2000, Russia’s
yearly inflation has averaged 13–14
per cent, which over 2001–07
resulted in total inflation of about 140
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per cent (Rosstat). Also over this
time, overall inflation in the EU was
only 15 per cent, and in the United
States 20 per cent. If one considers
the real exchange rate of the ruble
(its nominal exchange rate adjusted
for Russia’s level of inflation relative
to that of its trading partners), it
turns out that in real terms the ruble
appreciated against the euro by over
50 per cent between 2000 and 2007,
and against the US dollar by over 100
per cent (ERS International
Macroeconomic Data Set). As goods
produced in Russia became more
expensive compared to imports,
Russians switched to buying more
imported products.

Unter den neuen
Märkten ist Russland
nunmehr nach China
dank seines
Importwachstums zum
zweitgrößten
Agrarimporteur
avanciert.

,,

Rising Russian GDP and the
appreciating ruble increased Russian
consumer demand for imports. Yet,
Russian production of agricultural
goods also affected imports, given
that a rise in domestic output of an
imported good will reduce the
amount imported. From 2000 to
2007, Russian agricultural production
grew by about 25 per cent in volume
terms (Rosstat). However, this nontrivial growth did not prevent the
much higher growth in agricultural
imports. For example, from 2000 to
2007, Russian meat production
increased by 25 per cent in volume
terms to 4.6 million metric tons
(mmt), but imports rose by 78 per
cent to 3.22 mmt (World Trade Atlas).
Russian agriculture continues to
perform far below its potential, with
weaknesses in management, work
incentives, adoption of new
technology, and market linkages
(Lerman, 2008). The dominant type
of agricultural producer is still the
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Table 1: Effect of key variables on future Russian agricultural imports
Variable

GDP
Short term
Mid term
Real exchange rate
Inflation
Nominal exchange rate
Trade balance
Capital flows
Domestic production
Policy
Import tariffs
SPS-based import
restrictions
Subsidies

Expected future status

Expected
effect on
imports

change unlikely or direction uncertain
continue, and perhaps expand

ﬂ
›
?
›
?
›
ﬂ
ﬂ
ﬂ
?
ﬂ

increase

ﬂ

decreases
return to moderate to high growth
change unlikely or direction uncertain
relatively high
change unlikely or direction uncertain
surplus
outflows
increases, especially for poultry and pork

moribund former state and collective
farms, with most officially reorganised
during the transition period as joint
stock companies. The sector suffers
from a surplus of aged workers and a
shortage of skilled specialists, such as
in machinery use and repair, animal
care, and management.
Yet, a positive development during
the 2000s is the rise of new types of
agricultural ‘operators’, which typically
are large vertically-integrated
enterprises that bring advanced
technology, superior managerial
expertise, and investment into the
sector (Rylko et al., 2008). In the meat
industry, poultry production during
the 2000s has boomed, increasing by
about 250 per cent (to 1.38 mmt)
from 2000 to 2007, largely because of
the development of large modern
enterprises. Beef output, on the other
hand, continues its inexorable fall,
with production dropping from 1.84
mmt in 2000 to 1.37 mmt in 2007.
Russia still has not developed a
modern beef-producing industry, with
most production coming from the
culling of dairy cattle.

growth; and (4) Russian agricultural
policies. Table 1 gives the likely status
of these factors ⁄ variables in the near
to mid-term, and the probable effect
on imports.
The major event that will impact
these variables is the economic crisis
that hit Russia in autumn 2008.
Domestic causes of the crisis include
concern that speculation had driven
asset prices (especially stocks and
property) to unsustainably high
levels, worry about the overall
strength of the financial system, and
unease about the geopolitical
consequences of Russia’s

intervention in Georgia.
International-related causes are a
contagion effect from the US and
Western financial and economic
crisis. In particular, the world
recession has produced a plunge in
prices for oil and natural gas,
Russia’s main exports. Because of
the uncertainty involving both the
Russian and world crisis and their
effects, projecting the direction and
magnitude of change in the key
factors and variables that will impact
future Russian agricultural imports is
challenging. The following
predictions therefore are tentative.

GDP growth. Before the economic
crisis struck, macroeconomic
forecasters were projecting continued
high Russian annual GDP growth over
2008–12 of about 5–7 per cent.
However, the crisis will almost
certainly cause GDP to fall in 2009,
and perhaps also in 2010. In May
2009, the macroeconomic consulting
firm Global Insight forecast that 2009
Russian GDP would drop 4.7 per
cent. Global Insight also forecasts that
Russian GDP growth will rebound to
3.2 per cent in 2011 and 4.6 per cent
in 2012. If the economy does stabilise
within the next few years and then
growth of 3–5 per cent resumes,
rising incomes will increase consumer
demand for food, especially for meat
and other high value products.

What is the outlook for Russia’s
agricultural imports in the near
to medium term?
The main factors and variables that
will affect Russia’s agricultural imports
over the next few years are: (1) GDP
growth; (2) the ruble’s real exchange
rate; (3) Russian agricultural output

Sunflower seed is Russia’s main oilseed crop.
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Slaughter of dairy cattle is the main source of beef.

The isolated effect will be to boost
agricultural imports.

Real exchange rate of the ruble. The
change in the ruble’s real exchange
rate will depend on how high future
price inflation is in Russia compared
to its main trading partners, as well as
change in the ruble’s nominal
exchange rate. Each year in the
2000s, Russia had inflation of 9 per
cent or higher. Although inflation fell
from 2001 to 2007, 2008 inflation
jumped to 14 per cent (Global
Insight). It therefore appears likely
that over 2009–12, Russia will
experience annual inflation of at least
6–10 per cent (Global Insight in April
2009 forecast average annual
consumer price inflation of 10.8 per
cent). From 2001 to 2007, average
annual inflation in the EU region and
US was only 2–3 per cent. Because of
the financial and economic crisis that
hit the US, EU, and other major
Western economies in autumn 2008,
inflation in these countries in the
near to mid term is not expected to
be higher than over 2001–07. Higher
inflation in Russia compared to its
main trading partners will continue to
appreciate the ruble in real terms,
making imports less expensive
relative to Russian-produced goods.
The isolated effect will be to increase
imports.

What is likely to happen to the
ruble’s nominal exchange rate?
Nominal exchange rates are
determined by both trade flows and
capital flows. During the 2000s,
Russia has had large overall trade
surpluses. To put the surplus size in
perspective, in 2005 Russia’s trade
surplus of US$ 118 billion equaled 15
per cent of GDP (Global Insight). The
bulk of Russia’s export earnings has
come from oil products and natural
gas, and the climb in world energy
prices from 2002 to 2008 substantially
increased the country’s trade surplus.
In 2008, energy prices fell, with oil
dropping from a peak of US$ 147 a
barrel in July 2008 to US$ 32 in
January 2009, though by May 2009
the price had rebounded to US$ 60.
World oil and natural gas prices over
2009–12 will probably remain above
the low levels of 2000–02, suggesting
that Russia’s trade surpluses will
persist. The surpluses will strengthen
the ruble (because the world demand
to buy Russian goods with rubles will
exceed Russia’s demand to buy
foreign goods with foreign currency).
The isolated effect will be continued
high demand for imported
agricultural products.
High GDP growth and relative
macroeconomic stability in Russia in
the past few years helped motivate
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large foreign direct investment in
Russia, as well as investment in
existing assets (such as stocks and
property). For example, foreign
investment in Russia in 2007 equaled
US$ 121 billion (including portfolio
and direct; Rosstat). These capital
inflows also helped strengthen the
ruble. However, Russia’s economic
crisis of 2008–09 has reversed these
flows by triggering capital flight
(especially by foreign investors), with
net capital outflows in the 4th quarter
of 2008 alone equaling US$ 131
billion.

Import growth has
made Russia the
second largest
agricultural importer
among emerging
markets, after
China.

,,

The capital outflows have already
weakened the ruble, with the
ruble ⁄ euro exchange rate rising from
36.9 in mid-July 2008 to 44.1 in midApril 2009. However, the Russian
government appears committed to
containing the economic crisis. It has
injected substantial liquidity into the
banking system, as well as taken
other steps to prevent major banks or
other key financial intermediaries
from going bankrupt. The Russian
Central Bank has large foreign
exchange reserves (earned by the
country’s trade surpluses), and the
government big savings (from
previous fiscal surpluses), to support
the economy financially. These are
reasons why the Russian economy
could stabilise within a year or two.
Yet, whatever capital flight occurs
over the short term will weaken
(depreciate) the ruble, with the
isolated effect of reducing agricultural
imports.
Capital flows and their effect on the
exchange rate are the main element
of uncertainty in our outlook for
Russia’s agricultural imports. If capital
flight is large, the ruble could
continue to depreciate in nominal
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increased funding. From 2005 to
2007, total state support to
agriculture (from both the federal
and regional governments) rose 87
per cent in nominal rubles and 52 per
cent in real (inflation-adjusted) rubles
(Rosstat). The government has stated
that the main goal of agricultural
policy and increased support is to
expand the livestock sector, given its
large contraction during the transition
period.
Statements by the Russian
government indicate a strong desire
to reduce agricultural imports,
especially of meat (Interfax). In 2003,
Russia created tariff rate quotas
(TRQs) for imports of beef and
pork and a pure quota for poultry,
later converted also to a TRQ. In
January 2009, the government made
the TRQ regime more restrictive for
poultry and pork, by lowering the
low tariff quotas and raising the
out of quota tariffs. Growing state
support to agriculture and
continued use of sanitary and
phyto-sanitary (SPS) based import
controls would also help decrease
imports.

Large city dwellers are the main agricultural import consumers.

terms in the short to medium term
despite the country’s trade surplus. If
the nominal depreciation of the ruble
is so high that it exceeds the inflation
differential between Russia and its
major trading partners, the ruble
could depreciate in real as well as
nominal terms. This would make
imports more rather than less
expensive compared with domestic
production, and thereby reduce
agricultural imports.

output growth, especially if industries
modernise as has poultry. The large
‘new operators’ have been a
progressive development within the
sector, and should continue to
expand in numbers and influence.
Building on the modest progress
already made in this decade,
agricultural production should
continue to grow over the next
4–5 years, with the isolated effect of
reducing imports.

Agricultural production. As
mentioned before, total Russian
agricultural production grew over
2000–07 in volume by a quarter.
Poultry output rose impressively by
about 250 per cent. Tremendous
potential remains in Russian
agriculture for productivity and

Agricultural policy. The last major
factor that will affect Russia’s future
agricultural imports is government
policy involving production and trade.
In 2005, the Russian government
designated health, education,
housing, and agriculture as national
priority areas that would receive

A potential constraint on Russia’s
ability to reduce imports through
state policy would be accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
Russia officially began its WTO
accession bid in 1995 (and to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in 1993), and by early 2009 had
concluded bilateral negotiations with
almost all countries, including the EU
and US.
The three pillars of the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture are
market access, export subsidies, and
domestic support. With respect to all
three, Russia has been asking for
bound commitments above the
existing levels. (A bound commitment
is a maximum allowable level for the
future.) Russia’s current average
agricultural import tariff is about 18
per cent, up from 10 per cent in
2000. However, throughout its
accession negotiations, Russia has
been negotiating for bound
agricultural tariffs above actual
applied tariffs. Although Russia has
not used any agricultural export
EuroChoices 9(3) ƒ 47
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subsidies during the transition period,
and such subsidies have been
targeted for elimination within the
current Doha Development Round of
trade negotiations, Russia has been
requesting annual bound export
subsidies of US$ 726 million (to drop
over six years to US$ 465 million). On
domestic support, Russia is asking for
annual bound support of US$ 9.5
billion, which compares to its 2007
actual support level of US$ 5.7 billion
(Russia and World Trade
Organization; Rosstat).
In August 2008, the Russian
government announced that it was
withdrawing from certain
commitments made as part of its
WTO accession negotiations, and also
that the country had little to gain
from WTO membership. Yet, by the
end of the year it had resumed
accession negotiations. If Russia were
soon to join the WTO, it is unclear

what its bound level of tariffs and
support would be, perhaps above
current levels as the Russians have
been negotiating. Accession on such
terms would not liberalise Russian
agricultural trade and support
policies, and thereby not increase
imports, but would benefit the EU
and other foreign suppliers in the
long run by providing a cap on the
rise in tariffs and support. The
main gain to Russia’s agricultural
trading partners from the country’s
WTO accession might be that it
would give them an official forum
for challenging Russia’s sanitary
and phyto-sanitary import
restrictions.

Concluding comments
Of the main factors and variables
that will affect Russia’s future
agricultural imports, four should

develop in the near term in ways
that reduce imports — GDP (fall),
capital flows (out), domestic
agricultural production, and policy.
On the other hand, domestic
inflation and the country’s overall
trade balance (surplus) will probably
develop in directions that promote
imports. The likely renewal of GDP
growth in the mid term would
strengthen the import-expanding
forces. Capital flows and policy are
variables of major uncertainty, in
terms of both course and
magnitude. Forecasting the path of
Russia’s agricultural imports in the
near to mid term is therefore
difficult. Yet, if the Russian economy
stabilises within the next few years
and GDP growth returns, Russian
agricultural imports will also
probably resume growth, though at
a lower rate than in the past eight
years.
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summary
Russia’s Agricultural
Imports: Will the High
Growth of the 2000s
Continue?

Les importations
agricoles russes : la
forte croissance des
années 2000 va-t-elle se
poursuivre ?

Russlands Agrarimporte:
Wird das starke
Wachstum aus den
2000er Jahren anhalten?

Russia is the EU region’s
second largest foreign market
for agricultural goods, after the
United States, and in 2007 took 10
per cent of the EU’s agricultural
exports, worth €7.7 billion. During
the 2000s, Russian total agricultural
imports have grown considerably,
from €7.4 billion in 2000 to €19.2
billion in 2007, and imports from the
EU have increased accordingly. The
import growth has made Russia the
second largest agricultural importer
among emerging markets, after
China. The main imports are meat,
highly processed goods, fruits, and
vegetables. The main reasons for the
import rise are macroeconomic in
nature — high Russian GDP growth
which has increased consumer
income and purchasing power, and a
rise in the value of the ruble in real
(inflation-adjusted) terms, which
makes imports less expensive vis-à-vis
domestically produced goods. The
economic crisis that hit Russia in
autumn 2008 makes the outlook for
the country’s agricultural imports
uncertain. Nonetheless, the Russian
economy will probably stabilise within
the next few years, such that annual
GDP growth could rebound to 3–5
per cent. If so, agricultural imports
should resume growth, though at a
lower rate than in the recent past.

La Russie est le second plus
grand marché étranger de
l’Union européenne (UE) pour les
biens agricoles, après les États-Unis.
En 2007, elle a absorbé 10 pour cent
des exportations agricoles de l’UE,
soit 7.7 milliards d’euros. Au cours
des années 2000, l’ensemble des
importations agricoles de la Russie a
considérablement augmenté, passant
de 7.4 milliards d’euros en 2000 à
19.2 milliards en 2007, et celles en
provenance de l’EU ont évolué en
conséquence. La croissance de ses
importations a conduit la Russie à
devenir le second plus grand
importateur agricole des pays
émergents après la Chine. Les
principaux produits agricoles
importés sont la viande, les biens très
transformés, les fruits et les légumes.
La principale cause de cette hausse
des importations est de nature
macroéconomique — la forte
croissance du PIB russe a élevé le
revenu et le pouvoir d’achat des
consommateurs; et la hausse de la
valeur du rouble en termes réels
(ajustés de l’inflation) a rendu les
importations moins chères que les
biens produits sur le marché
intérieur. La crise économique qui a
touché la Russie à l’automne 2008
rend les perspectives sur les
importations agricoles du pays
incertaines. Cependant, l’économie
de la Russie va probablement se
stabiliser dans les prochaines années,
de sorte que la croissance annuelle
du PIB pourrait de nouveau atteindre
trois à cinq pour cent. Si c’était le
cas, les importations agricoles
devraient reprendre leur croissance,
mais à un taux moindre que ces
dernières années.

Nach den Vereinigten Staaten
ist Russland das zweitgrößte
Importland für Agrargüter der EU;
2007 umfassten die EU-Agrarexporte
nach Russland zehn Prozent bzw. den
Wert von 7,7 Mrd. EUR. Während der
2000er Jahre ist der Gesamtwert der
russischen Agrarimporte erheblich
angestiegen, nämlich von 7,4 Mrd.
EUR (2000) auf 19,2 Mrd. EUR (2007);
entsprechend haben die Importe aus
der EU zugenommen. Unter den
neuen Märkten ist Russland nunmehr
nach China dank seines
Importwachstums zum zweitgrößten
Agrarimporteur avanciert. Zu den
Hauptimportgütern zählen Fleisch,
hochverarbeitete Güter, Obst und
Gemüse. Der Importzuwachs hat vor
allem makroökonomische Gründe –
ein hoher Anstieg des russischen
Bruttoinlandsprodukts, wodurch sich
das Verbrauchereinkommen und die
Kaufkraft erhöht hat, sowie die
(inflationsbereinigte) reale
Aufwertung des Rubel, wodurch
Importgüter im Vergleich zu
einheimischen Produkten günstiger
werden. Die Wirtschaftskrise traf
Russland im Herbst 2008 und
zeichnet eine unsichere Prognose für
die Agrarimporte des Landes. Die
russische Wirtschaft wird sich jedoch
wahrscheinlich innerhalb der
kommenden Jahre stabilisieren, so
dass sich das jährliche Wachstum des
Bruttoinlandsprodukts wieder bei 3–5
Prozent einpendeln könnte. Ist dies
der Fall, werden die Agrarimporte
wieder wachsen, wenn auch
langsamer als zuvor.
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